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Introduction
For a number of years, policymakers in low income countries have included productive entrepreneurship as a key part of their strategies for inclusive growth. In contrast to necessity (or subsistence) entrepreneurship aiming at survival, opportunity entrepreneurship can help people escape poverty and contribute to development (Bruton et al., 2013) . 2 In many LICs, however, opportunity entrepreneurship and its contribution to growth and job creation have been limited. One of the reasons is the overall weak business environment and large skill gaps, especially when compared to more advanced economies.
The attention on entrepreneurship as a driver of growth and productivity has heightened with the low global growth and the slow-down in world trade. To guide efforts aimed at stimulating entrepreneurship, the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) group has developed the 'Entrepreneurship Enabling Conditions' framework, which clusters factors conducive to entrepreneurship into: i) basic requirements (e.g. institutions, infrastructure, macroeconomic stability and human capital); ii) efficiency enhancers (e.g. better education, goods and labor market efficiency, financial sector development, technological readiness and market size) and iii) innovation and entrepreneurship policies ( Herrington and Kelley; .
Relatedly, this paper examines the role of institutions, the business environment and skills for firm creation and performance in low income countries.
3 It presents a model of start-ups in an economy with a rigid business environment, skill gaps, and matching frictions. The model builds on Brixiová (2013) and Brixiová and Égert (2012) . Similarly to Bah and Fang (2015) it emphasizes the business environment. The paper is related to the literature on education and entrepreneurship, recently applied to Malawi by Kolstad and Wiig (2015) . It builds on Redding (1996) and Snower (1996) who model strategic complements in production and related externalities. It shows how an economy can end up in a low-productivity equilibrium, where the overall less productive informal sector provides most of employment. The results of the model are tested on aggregate data for entrepreneurship, governance, business environment and education for a large set of countries. Both theoretical and empirical results show that to move the economy into a productive equilibrium, complementarities matters: reforms to the business environment are more effective in creating productive firms when accompanied by narrowing skill gaps and vice versa.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a literature overview and establishes the paper's contribution relative the literature. Section 3 presents stylized facts on entrepreneurship, institutions, business regulations and education. Section 4 presents the model, the results and model sensitivity analysis.. Section 5 tests the model on a large set of cross country covering developing, emerging and advances economies. Section 6 finally provides some concluding remarks.
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A Brief Review of Literature
This paper develops a model of entrepreneurial start-ups in an economy with frictions in the labor and product markets and with a sizeable informal sector, as is the case of many low-income countries. The model builds on several strands of the literature. First, it extends the framework of Brixiová and Égert (2012) for transition economies and Brixiová (2013) for developing countries to the case of low income countries by modeling: i) imperfect competition (and information) in the labor market for skilled workers, and ii) frictions in product markets. The model focuses on the creation of new firms as driver of job creation, productivity increase and growth.
Second, in line with Redding (1996) and Snower (1996) , we model entrepreneurs' search for business opportunities and workers' training as strategic complements with both exhibiting economic externalities as incentives for undertaking them interdependently. The model shows that in low-income countries where institutions are weak and exchanges in the labor market for skilled workers are sparse, labor and product market failures lead to suboptimal outcomes. The large informal sector and the lack of institutions blur entrepreneurs' information about available workers and discourage them from creating firms. In turn, insufficient firm creation discourages workers from acquiring skills. Together with the rigid business climate, these frictions impede highlyproductive private firms to employ skilled labor. In the absence of government coordinating policies, the economy may be 'trapped' in a low-skill and low firm creation equilibrium.
The paper also draws on two strands of literature on endogenous growth theory: i) on human capital accumulation as in Lucas (1988) and Stokey (1991) , and ii) on innovation and productivity improvements driven by new firm entrants, as in Acemoglu and Cao (2015) and Bena et al. (2015) 4 . Similarly, Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) show that because of high social value to discovering costs of new activities, policymakers should encourage investment in productive entrepreneurship. Against this background, we study how, in low-income countries, weak institutions and education systems can impede both the creation of highly productive firms and accumulation of human capital. Lastly, our paper is related to the literature on firm entry barriers and firm size distribution pioneered by Jovanovich (1982) , Evans and Jovanovich (1989) and Hopenhayn (1992) . (Our contributions to this strand lies in shedding light on factors contributing to firm size distribution in low-income countries, with the bulk of firms being small and operating in the informal sector.
The model reflects several stylized facts of the urban labor markets in low income countries, such as the existence of a dual economy where a small modern industrialized sector coexists with a large informal sector with little capital and low marginal productivity of labor. It examines which policies help develop the highly productive formal SME sector. In sum, the model in this paper focuses on start-ups of highly productive private firms in the formal sector, as their absence is an important constraint to productivity and job growth in a number of low income countries (see, for example, Auriol, 2013 and Klapper et al., 2006) .
The empirical contribution of the paper is to shed light on the fact that weak institutions and skill/education shortages are complementary with regard to the creation of new businesses. A 4 string of papers has studied the relationship between institutions and regulations on the one hand and firm entry on the other hand (Desai et al., 2003; Troilo, 2011; Estrin et al., 2013 and Bripi, 2016) . Other papers looked at how education influences entrepreneurship and firm growth (Elert, 2012; Lee 2014) .Still, to the best of our knowledge, the empirical literature raising the issue of complementarity between education and institutions and regulation is non-existent. In this paper, we try to fill this gap with an empirical analysis for a large panel of countries including developing, emerging and advanced economies. .
Stylized Facts
This section presents several stylized facts on the quality of the business environment, education and new firm creation. 5 The business environment can be captured by several indicators. A measure that captures framework stability is the quality of regulations. Panel A of Figure 1 below suggests that higher regulatory quality is associated with higher new firm density, which proxies new firm creation. More generally, higher cost of starting a business and weak property rights can be particularly damaging to entrepreneurship: they hinder entrepreneurship either at the very start by barring entry or by raising the risk of losses directly through expropriation and indirectly due to increased uncertainty. A broad measure of uncertainty is political instability. There is indeed a strong connection between higher political instability and less firm creation and thus reduced entrepreneurships (panel B of Figure 1 
below).
Other measures of framework uncertainty include the degree of corruption and the strength of the rule of law. Admittedly, these factors increase uncertainty about future outlook. Greater corruption means higher transaction costs (through bribes and other forms of payments). It also means that laws and rules are applied with discretion and that they can be discriminative and that there is no play level field for businesses. It may also imply that laws are not enforced or are interpreted on a case-by-case basis. This is captured by the rule of law indicator. Panel B of Figure 1 indicates that increased uncertainty stemming from higher political uncertainty, more corruption and weaker rule of law are associated with a lower new business density. Panel C also shows that these effects do not change if splitting the sample into pre-and post-crisis periods.
The data plotted below indicate that more low-income countries operate in a low-quality institution environment. . Defining low-income countries as countries having per capita income below 5000 USD (constant PPP) at any point in time 6 , it appears that all these countries are in the bottom half of the distribution regarding regulatory quality. These countries also score badly in terms of political instability, the extent of corruption and the strength of the rule of law. Most of them are clustered below zero and only a few countries in few instances exhibit a little more stability (panel D in Figure 1 ). These observations suggest that policy interventions aimed at improving the framework conditions could substantially encourage firm creation and entrepreneurship. Firm entry is one of the main drivers of productivity growth. New firms increase competition, which promote a more efficiently allocation of resources across and within firms. Productivity growth is admittedly the single most important driver of long-term economic growth (see e.g. OECD, 2015).
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Hence, developing countries could benefit enormously from enhancing framework conditions more conducive to firm creation. Above and beyond a general framework helping the entry, thriving and exit of businesses including regulation and macroeconomic and political stability, an educational system that would instill entrepreneurial attitudes early on is of primary importance. 7 Education and training for both entrepreneurs and workers, accompanied by job or entrepreneurial search assistance, is an important driver of entrepreneurial start-ups. Eyeball econometrics provides a strong case for this: a population's overall educational achievement seems to be connected with the intensity of firm creation. Figure 2 plots three measures of educational outcomes against new firm density. A higher share of people without education goes hand in hand with reduced firm creation. Measures reflecting the amount of education received over one's lifetime correlate positively with the number of new start-ups: higher mean years of schooling and a greater share of the working age 7 population with tertiary education is reflected in more new businesses.
8 Again, this indicates that efforts to improve the quantity of education could probably result in more firm creation and hence better economic outcomes. 
The Model and Policy Analysis
This section develops a model illustrating the role of an enabling business environment and skills for stimulating productive entrepreneurship and reflecting the role of skill shortages.
The Environment
The population is normalized to one. There are two types of agents, entrepreneurs and workers, with population shares and , respectively. They live for one period, are endowed with one unit of time and amount of consumption good, and have preferences, , where denotes consumption good and E the expectations agents form at the beginning of the period. 
Entrepreneurs
8 opportunity with productivity per worker . They can turn a business opportunity into a highlyproductive firm by hiring skilled workers.
The entrepreneurs who found business opportunities in the formal sector and unemployed skilled workers engage in a time-consuming process of search and matching. Similarly to Fonseca et al. (2005) , the process is governed by an aggregate matching function. 9 Denoting as number of entrepreneurs who found business opportunity can hire skilled workers, the technology h that matches the aggregate skilled vacancies, , with skilled workers searching for employment, , is as follows:
( 1) where h is the total number of matches and A denotes matching efficiency. 1  A since skilled workers have imperfect information about available vacancies and entrepreneurs with skilled vacancies are also not fully aware of available skilled workers. Policy measures that raise the efficiency of the matching process thus include information dissemination and, more generally, job search support, establishment of a national job databases, and quality of labor market placement offices. Transport infrastructure and housing supply are also important, as they allow linking suitable jobs and workers in different locations, overcoming regional mismatches.
Entrepreneurs with a high-productivity business opportunity find skilled workers with probability .
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After finding a highly-productive business opportunity and skilled workers, entrepreneurs pay start-up cost 11 Firms in the formal sector pay profit tax  and earn after-tax profit:
Where s w is the wage of skilled workers (in the formal sector), determined through bargaining.
Entrepreneurs who do not find highly-productive opportunities or skilled workers open lowproductivity firms in the informal sector, with productivity per worker of . The entrepreneurs' 9 In their dynamic search model, the matching function takes Cobb-Douglas form described. 10 As Snower (1996) points out, when firms are imperfectly informed about the availability of skilled workers, even skills that are useful to all firms are not general since not all firms have access to these workers. In (1) to reflect imperfections in the matching process. 
productivity is further lowered by the business climate factor in the informal sector where . 12 The entrepreneurs employ unskilled workers, , where , that is firms in the informal sector are smaller. Entrepreneurs in the informal sector do not pay taxes, but are subjected to tax monitoring and full confiscation for tax evasion. Their profit amounts to:
where is the wage of an unskilled worker in a low-productivity, informal firm, which equals the income, b, of the self-employed in the informal sector, and is the probability that the firm's tax evasion is detected by the tax authority. In sum, are productivity levels in highproductivity firms (in the formal sector), low-productivity firms (in the informal sector), and selfemployed, respectively.
Workers
When acquiring skills demanded in the highly productive private firms, workers incur cost, 2 / ) (
where is the cost parameter. Their effort results in probability q of obtaining skills 13 and probability of finding a job in a highly productive firm. Workers who do not obtain skilled jobs work in the informal sector, either as self-employed or in a lowproductive firm. In both cases they earn income .
While the market for unskilled workers is perfectly competitive, wages for the skilled workers are set through decentralized bargaining between the skilled workers and the productive private firms. If bargaining does not lead to an agreement, the workers would receive income from selfemployment in the informal sector, . The outcome of decentralized bargaining depends on the relative strength of the skilled worker and the firm, :
The wage gap between skilled and unskilled jobs amounts to ) (
Labor Market Clearing Conditions
The characterization of the environment is completed by the labor market equilibrium conditions. Denoting as the share of entrepreneurs running low-productivity firms and employ the unskilled workers, the market clearing condition for the entrepreneurs is:
12 Dethier at al. (2011) observe that not only can better business environments cause firms to be more efficient, but that also that inherently more efficient firms choose better business environments. 13 x (and q) are between 0 and 1. Despite their efforts, workers (entrepreneurs) occasionally fail to acquire skills (find business opportunities).
Denoting s n to be the total number of skilled labor employed in the formal private sector, the total unskilled labor in the informal sector, and as the total number of selfemployed in the informal sector, the labor market equilibrium condition for workers is:
Multiple Equilibria
An equilibrium in this economy is defined as an allocation of entrepreneurs and workers and wage rate such that: (i) each entrepreneur chooses the effort x put into search for business opportunities; (ii) each workers chooses effort q put into acquiring skills; (iii) wage rate is set through Nash bargaining as in (4); and (iv) labor market clearance conditions are met.
14 In equilibrium, the marginal cost of entrepreneur's search for a business opportunity equals the net profit as in Equation (7). Similarly, the worker's marginal cost of acquiring skills equals the expected difference between a skilled wage and alternative income, given by (8):
and s w specified in Equation (4). Equations (7) and (8) can be obtained by solving entrepreneur´s and worker´s problems, together with the labor market clearing conditions (5) and (6). In (7), The equilibria form at the intersections of the entrepreneurs' 'search curve' as in (7) and workers' 'training curve' given by (8) and (4). The system described by (4), (7) and (8) can lead to two equilibria: (i) a low-productivity equilibrium, where entrepreneurs exhort limited effort to start firms and (ii) a high-productivity equilibrium with higher effort by entrepreneurs. There are also nonlinearities in the relationship between firm start-ups, institutions and skills. Specifically, at low skill levels and with underdeveloped institutions these two factors can act as substitutes, while at higher levels they become complements.
14 It is straightforward to show that depending on the parameters, the model either has (i) a unique 'low-productivity' equilibrium where workers and entrepreneurs exert zero effort or (ii) one 'low productivity' and one 'high productivity' equilibrium with positive efforts by workers and entrepreneurs. 15 In (7) and (8), the number of skilled vacancies is , where is the number of entrepreneurs who found a highly productive business opportunity. Similarly, the number of skilled workers searching is . 
Low Productivity Equilibrium
The first equilibrium is the low productivity trap, where -under a shortage of private firm, i.e. q n x s ) 1 (     -the business environment (i.e. tax rates, start -up cost, search cost) is such that
. Equation (7) shows that in such environment where difference in profit between running high and low productivity (informal sector) firm is small, entrepreneurs will not search for highly productive business opportunities, i.e. x = 0. Equation (8) in turn shows that workers will not acquire skills i.e. q = 0. The economy will thus consist only of low-productive firms and unskilled workers, both operating in the informal sector. 16 As Snower (1996) emphasized for the case of developed countries, when the economy is in a low-productivity equilibrium (or 'low-skill, bad-job trap'), the need for public stimulus rises markedly relative to other equilibrium cases.
Profit tax rate is a key policy instrument impacting the equilibrium outcome, as it helps determine the difference in profitability between running a high-productivity (formal sector) and lowproductivity (informal sector) firm. Running a private firm in the formal sector needs to be sufficiently profitable to enable entrepreneurs to cover cost of searching for business opportunities.
High Productivity Equilibrium
The second, high productivity equilibrium comprises both positive entrepreneurial search and workers' learning efforts (x, q>0). A pre-condition is a business environment conducive enough so that profits in the highly productive private firms employing skilled workers sufficiently higher than those in productive firms with unskilled workers, i.e. 0   u s   . In this equilibrium, the economy consists of both high productivity private firms in the formal sector, low productivity firms in the informal sector as well as self-employed workers in the informal sector.
Policy Analysis
In this section, we relate the key parameters of our model to evidence on institutions in low income countries. During a start-up phase, each entrepreneur searches for a business opportunity. After a suitable opportunity is identified, the entrepreneurs need to turn it into productive firms. At this stage, they can be hampered by cumbersome registering and licensing procedures, stringent hiring regulations, and the lack of skilled workers, among other factors. The ability of the legal framework to protect property rights is equally important, as it influences the expected profit and hence effort that entrepreneurs put into search. The entrepreneurs also consider the state of the financial infrastructure such as development of capital markets, control of corruption, and effectiveness of the government during their start-up phase. 16 The second case is when the share of skilled workers is below that or same as the share of skilled vacancies, i.e. , unskilled workers will not have incentives to obtain training. The absence of the skilled workers will remove incentives for entrepreneurs to search for business opportunities requiring skilled workers.
Strengthening Institutions
This section underscores the impact of improved institutions on (i) entrepreneurs' search for highly-productive business opportunities; and (ii) workers' effort to acquire skills. It follows from (4), (7) and (8)  and lower  ) will encourage entrepreneurs to intensify their search effort (x) for productive business opportunities. This in turn, will incentivize unskilled workers to acquire skills. 17 A more intense search by entrepreneurs due to improved institutions/business environment and the subsequent additional learning efforts by workers will result in a higher number of productive firms, increased output, and additional productive employment.
Reforming Property Rights
Unclear property rights, which imply a possibility of expropriation (where ), are an important component of the business climate in many low income countries. Denoting probability of expropriation as , the efficiency coefficient in the production function changes to
Entrepreneurs are more likely end up running low productivity firms in the informal sector, as the expected profit in the formal sector is reduced by the possibility of expropriation. The reverse also holds -if improvements to property rights are sufficiently large, entrepreneurs who will increase their search effort and more likely end up in the formal sector.
Given two negative externalities (searching and learning) that characterize the low-productivity trap, sizeable interventions both on the side of business environment (generating labor demand) and training (improving quality of labor supply) are needed. The non-linearity in the searching and learning are key for prioritizing interventions. Specifically, policies should first target the most significant constraint to the creation of productive firms. In sectors or communities with shortages of productive firms, policies should focus on better business environment to encourage entrepreneurial search. In (some high-tech) sectors characterized by skill shortages, interventions encouraging training should be prioritized. Since the binding constraint may be changing over time, complementary, and well-sequenced, policies would be most effective.
An Illustrative Numerical Solution
This section illustrates the impact of policies including an improved functioning of the labor market and business environment as well as lower cost of search for business and reduced profit Applying the parameters from Table 1 to the model generate a a share of the informal sector in total employment of 50 percent and that of informal sector firms in total firms of 71 percent. The indicative elasticity of informal sector employment to changes in each of the policy variables may be calculated by changing the value of these variables by 20 percent and computing the new informal employment rate.
The results reported in Table 2 are consistent with those in the earlier sections: improvements in the business climate would increase the number of highly-productive firms and would boost highskilled employment. In this example, the 20 percent improvement would lower low skilled/lowwage employment in the informal sector by 27 percent, with a corresponding increase in employment in the formal sector. Another effective way of raising productive, formal sector employment is to improve the functioning of the labor market, including through provision of information and reducing costs of job search. Table 2 also shows that reduced costs of entrepreneurial search (search subsidy) would increase the number of highly productive firms and skilled employment (in both the formal or informal sectors). For firms in the formal sector, wage subsidies or income tax cuts would have a similar effect. Yet they would not impact informal sector firms unless the cuts/subsidies were sufficiently large to induce these firms to formalize.
The results show that government interventions can improve upon the laissez-faire outcome as the economy is characterized by suboptimal level of little investment in education and skill acquisition as well as limited incentives for entrepreneurship in their absence. Optimal policy counteracts these market failures and pro-actively encourages both firm creation and skill acquisition. Source: Authors' calculations. 1/ Original shares in the formal sector were 30% or firms and 50% for employment.
Empirical Analysis
This section sets out to study empirically the issues raised in the stylized facts and then described and analyzed more formally in our model. The econometric estimations reported hereafter are based on a large sample covering as many countries as possible, including developing, emerging and advanced economies. Threshold regressions are used to investigate whether the business environment and education are complementary for firm creation. This section first describes the data used. It then presents the estimation approach. It finally reports the estimation results and provides some policy implications and conclusions.
Data Issues
The relationship between entrepreneurship on the one hand and institutions, the business environment and education on the other are tested on a cross country dataset, including around 100 developing, emerging and advanced economies. Entrepreneurship is measured by the number of new businesses, normalized by population (new business density). For institutions, we make use of the World Bank's World Governance Indicators. This database contains six variables, which are very strongly correlated with each other. Therefore, we pick the variable capturing political stability. For the business environment, the World Bank's Doing business indicators are employed. This database includes variables measuring the costs of starting a business. More specifically, the indicator measuring the number of procedures necessary to start a business will be used in the empirical analysis. Finally, education is measured by three variables: 1.) people with tertiary education as a share in the population of 25 years of age or more; 2.) the mean years of schooling, and 3.) the share of population without education as a share of the population 25+ years. These series are drawn from the Barro-Lee database on education and the World Bank's World Development Indicators database. These three indicators on education are a measure of the quantity of education and do not necessarily reflect quality aspects. Yet the amount of education most likely captures fairly well the quantity and the quality of education in our sample covering a large number of countries. Differences in quantity are large enough across countries so that quantity also reflects quality (or quality does not matter much). Table 3 provides an overview of the data used for the estimations. Panel A gives some descriptive statistics. Panel B reports the correlation between the variables. The correlation between the various explanatory variables appears moderate. An exception is the correlation between the alternative measures of education. These variables will therefore be used individually, and not jointly, in the regressions in order to avoid the problem of multi-collinearity. 
Modelling Issues
In the baseline model, the number of new firms per capita is regressed on our measure of institutions / business environment and the education variable. Institutions and business environment are not included at the same time as these variables are highly correlated with each other.
. sin 2 1 (9) Equation (9) is estimated using OLS. Statistical significance is obtained on the basis of heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. All equations reported below are based on a sample excluding outliers of the dependent variable.
In order to explore complementarities between different policies, we use threshold regressions. They help tell us if the impact of the business environment on business density is different depending on the level of education or the other way around. The threshold value is determined endogenously through a grid search: a grid search with steps of 1% of the distribution is carried out to find the value of the threshold variable that minimises the sum of squared residuals of the estimated two-regime model. The grid search starts at 30% of the distribution and stops at 70% to ensure that a sufficient number of observations fall into each regime. There is evidence for nonlinearity if the null hypothesis of 
Estimation Results
The estimations results of the linear specification (equation 9) lend support to the hypothesis that institutions, regulations and educational outcomes all matter to a large degree for firm creation. We find that better institutions, measured by the political stability, encourage entrepreneurship and business dynamics (columns 1 to 3 in Table 4 ). Also, a more business friendly regulatory environment, captured by the (lower) number of procedures needed to start a business, appear to boost the number of new firms (columns 4 to 6 in Table 4 ). Finally, we find that better educational outcomes are associated with a higher number of newly created firms (columns 1 to 6 in Table 4 ). More specifically, the coefficients on share of people with tertiary education and the mean years of schooling are precisely estimated and have the expected positive sign. Also, and in line with expectations, the share of people without education (people without primary education) is negatively correlated with new firm creation.
These results are reasonably robust to whether the pre-2007 or post-crisis period is considered. Panels B and C of Table 4 report estimations results which are based on period averages for 2004-07 and 2008-12, respectively . The results do not move an inch for the pre-crisis period. Results are also robust for the post-crisis period. The only exceptions are the means year of schooling and the share of population without education (columns 2 and 3), which are not precisely estimated in the equations including political stability. Nevertheless, all three education variables are very robust in the regressions including the cost of starting business variables (columns 4 to 12). More generally, our findings hold for semi-log specifications when the variables on business environment and education are taken in logs (columns 7 to 9) and for log-log specifications (columns 10 to 12) for the entire sample but also for the two subsamples.. 21 21 Further robustness checks include the use of a variable measuring access to finance, namely the private credit to GDP ratio. This variable is not overly robust but leaves the variables included in the baseline specifications largely unchanged. Table 4 . Business density, institutions, business environment and education Note: * and ** indicate statistical significance at the 10% and 5% levels, based on robust standard errors.
Our theoretical model posits that the effect of skills (proxied by education) on entrepreneurship (new firm density) varies with the quality of the business environment achieved. In fact, the positive effects of education on entrepreneurship are larger in a pro-business environment than in a business-unfriendly regulatory environment. To test the hypothesis of complementarity between education and the quality of the business environment, we estimate threshold regressions in accordance with equations (10) and (11).
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Our estimation results support the view that better educational outcomes lead to more firm creation if it is easier to start a new business. This result indeed suggests that more educated people would create their firms and that they would hire more high-skill workers if the transaction costs are low. But this result also suggests that the effectiveness of educational improvements on entrepreneurship is limited when the costs of business creation are high. Looking at the detailed estimation outputs reported in Table 5 , it appears that the coefficient estimates on the mean years of schooling and tertiary education are higher as the administrative burdens to start a business decreases. 22 We also experimented by the inclusion of interaction terms between education and the business environment / quality of institutions but the estimation results did not show any significant interactions between these variables. Our results also indicate to some extent that the complementarity between education and better framework conditions works the other way around. That is, the more pro-business regulatory environment will be associated with more firm creation, conditional on higher education outcomes. The specific estimation results reported in column 4 of Table 5 show that the higher the share of uneducated people is, the lower the positive impact on new firm creation of increased political stability is. The last question we would like to answer in this paper is whether the effect of education and institutions on new business density depends on the level of economic development, measured by per capita income (USD, constant PPP). is used as the threshold variable.
The estimation results suggest that for countries with per capita income levels roughly below USD 10.000, primary education matters most whereas tertiary education and the mean years of schooling have a positive effect above this threshold. More specifically, the coefficient estimate on the share of people without primary education is strongly negative blow the threshold and not significant above it (columns 1 to 5 in Table 6 ). Conversely, the other two education variables become statistically significant above that threshold
These findings suggest that basic skills matters most in developing countries. But as countries develop and once there is a broad base for basic skills, secondary and tertiary education matters mostly once there is a broad base for basic skill.
(1) (2) (3) (4) 2.671* 1.377 8.649** 3.687** political stability starting a business (no. procedures) -0.12 -0.128 -0.549** share with tertiary education LOW REGIME 0.279** share with tertiary education HIGH REGIME 0.062 mean years of schooling LOW REGIME 0.537** mean years of schooling HIGH REGIME 0.237** share without education LOW REGIME -0.071** share without education HIGH REGIME -0.034** share without education -0.04** political stability LOW REGIME 2.388** political stability HIGH REGIME 1.106** starting a business (no. procedures) LOW REGIME starting a business (no. procedures) HIGH REGIME 
Conclusions
This paper investigated the relationship between the intensity of entrepreneurship on the one hand and institutions, the regulatory environment and skill mismatches on the other hand. 'We developed a model of entrepreneurial start-ups where an equilibrium outcome could be a low-skill, low-productivity trap. We showed that strengthened institutions and education would foster creation of high-productivity private firms, output and employment. The model suggests that reforms to improve the regulatory environment and educational outcomes are complementary. Our empirical estimation results, carried out on large cross-section of countries, confirm the model results and show that more business friendly regulations amplify the positive impact of better education and reduced skill mismatches on firm start-ups.
The first policy implication is that policymakers should strive to improve institutions, the business environment and the education system to spur productive entrepreneurship and thus to achieve better economic outcomes. While this is a hardly surprising conclusion, a more interesting policy implication is that in areas of strategic complements, policy reforms should not be carried out sequentially. That is rather than reforming one area at a time, and once completed, reforming another area, policymakers should move on key aspects of reforms simultaneously to maximize their impact. As the empirical evidence in our paper showed, they should seek to improve institutions, the regulatory framework and the education system in parallel, as reform in one area will positively reinforce the impact of a reform in another area.
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